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The period between 1995 and 2008 is one of the fundamental transformations
in the Greek economy. In that sense, we would expect an equally drastic change
to have taken place in the structure of the taxation system. Nevertheless, no
such change occurred. The explanation of this seeming paradox should be
sought in the peculiar distributive (as opposed to redistributive) character of the
Greek taxation system. The aim of this paper is to provide evidence for this
phenomenon from a political economy perspective. The ﬁrst section examines
the general trends of taxation in Greece during the period 1995–2008 and the
structure of personal income taxation. The second section delineates the basic
features of the reform in income taxation and land taxation effected by the con-
servative government; lastly, the third part provides some critical commentary
on the data as well as an interpretive context for the peculiar features of the
Greek taxation system.
Keywords: Greece; taxation; political economy
Preface
The period between 1995 and 2008 is one of the fundamental transformations in
the Greek economy. The robust economic growth,1 the dominance of the service
sector and the decline of manufacturing and agriculture,2 the increase in the number
of wage earners and the decline of self-employment,3 the strengthening of large
companies at the expense of smaller ones,4 the massive inﬂux of immigrants and
women in the labour market,5 the outward expansion of Greek companies towards
Southeast Europe and Turkey, the liberalization of the ﬁnancial system and the
country’s accession to the Eurozone are all aspects of a radical change that took
place over this period.6
In the light of the above, we would expect an equally drastic change to have
taken place in the structure of the taxation system, especially since it is a common
assumption that the taxation system in Greece is counterproductive, unequal and
outdated. Nevertheless, no such change occurred. The explanation of this seeming
paradox should be sought in the peculiar distributive (as opposed to redistributive)
character of the Greek taxation system; namely, in the fact that governmental inter-
ventions between 1995 and 2008 resulted in the distribution of the surplus, gener-
ated from the robust economic growth, towards business elites and speciﬁc social
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groups, instead of being utilized in order to fund a reform of the taxation system
that could ensure a more just distribution of the tax burden.
The aim of this paper is to provide evidence for this phenomenon from a politi-
cal economy perspective. The ﬁrst section examines the general trends of taxation
in Greece during the period 1995–2008 and the structure of personal income
taxation. The second section delineates the basic features of the reform in income
taxation and land taxation effected by the conservative government; lastly, the third
part provides some critical commentary on the data as well as an interpretive
context for the peculiar features of the Greek taxation system.
1. The structure of the Greek taxation system
1.1. Public expenditure and the importance of the taxation system
Despite a widely held belief, the Greek state is not costly as such. As indicated in
Table 1, Greece’s public expenses (as a percentage of the GDP) do not exceed the
Eurozone average. Even though public expenses in Greece are managed quite
inefﬁciently, being as they are poorly targeted and distributed in an unproductive
manner (Förster and Pearson 2002; Maniatis 2003; Dafermos and Papatheodorou
2010), their volume is by no means excessive in comparison with other Eurozone
members.
At ﬁrst, it has to be reminded that during the post-war period with the expan-
sion of the welfare state in Western Europe, Greece was in political turmoil. The
civil war, the authoritarian regimes of the ’50s and ’60s and the military junta
(’67–’74) resulted in the exclusion of large sectors of the population from the wel-
fare state. At the end of the ‘70s, there was still no universal health care system or
welfare services in place. In this sense, the particularity of the Greek case also
stems from the fact that the welfare state was developed gradually, over a period of
global economic turbulence (for a detailed discussion see Gravaris 1998). For all
these reasons, public expenditure accelerated sharply after the mid ’80s mainly as a
result of a much-needed expansion of the welfare state and of the implementation
of a sizeable public infrastructure programme, as well as due to an increase in
Table 1. Total general government tax receipts, revenue and expenditure as a percentage of
GDP.
Total tax receipts
Total receipts from
taxes and SC* Total revenue Total expenditure
Euro area Greece Euro area Greece Euro area Greece Euro area Greece
1996 24.2 21.4 41.4 34.3 n.a 41.9 50.6 49.4
1998 25.6 24.2 41.7 37.7 n.a 45.3 48.6 49.6
2000 26.0 23.6 41.8 36.0 46.2 43.0 46.2 46.7
2002 24.9 21.7 40.5 35.3 44.9 40.3 47.6 45.1
2004 24.8 19.9 40.3 33.2 44.6 38.1 47.5 45.5
2006 25.8 20.7 41.0 33.2 45.4 39.2 46.8 45.3
2008 25.3 20.7 40.6 33.9 45.1 40.7 47.2 50.6
2010 24.5 20.3 40.0 33.6 44.8 40.6 51.0 51.5
Source: Eurostat, Statistics Database, Economy and ﬁnance, Government statistics.
*(Including imputed social contributions) after deduction of amounts assessed but unlikely to be
collected.
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interest payments on the public debt. Nonetheless, the general volume of public
expenditure did not rise beyond OECD or European levels.
At the same time, the increase in revenues did not follow suit with spending, a
fact which resulted in a growing government deﬁcit. The real ﬁscal problem, there-
fore lay in the revenues, which remained consistently well below both the public
expenses and the Eurozone average. To sum up, the Greek ﬁscal problem is one of
the poor revenues and not of exorbitant expenses, which is why the structure and
function of the taxation system should be seen as a factor of major importance.
In the relevant theoretical literature as well as the case studies, it has been
argued that increasing levels of economic activity are accompanied by high levels
of public expenditure. For example, a number of authors suggest (e.g. Tanzi 1987;
Bird and Zolt 2005) that while there are signiﬁcant variations in the tax ratio
among different countries, the general trend is that the tax ratio in high-income
countries is considerably higher than the tax ratio in low-income countries. More-
over, the structure of the taxation system also differs according to the level of
national income. Higher income countries tend to gain a larger proportion of tax
revenues through income taxes. By contrast, lower income countries mostly rely οn
consumption and border taxes (Tanzi 1987; Tanzi and Zee 2000; Fox and Gurley
2005; Bird 2007).
Nonetheless, Kaplanoglou and Rapanos (2012) have pointed out that when
Greece is compared to the rest of the world on the basis of the structure of tax rev-
enues, it resembles to a developing rather than to a developed country. Despite the
fact that tax revenues increased as the country achieved higher growth levels, they
remained at considerable lower levels compared to the rest of the OECD or
Eurozone countries. Consumption taxes continue to be the most important source
of tax revenues, while income taxes are of more peripheral signiﬁcance. What is
more, the structure of revenues from income taxation indicates an unequal distribu-
tion of the taxation burden at the expense of wage earners and pensioners because
of the high level of tax evasion and tax avoidance of the self-employed, the farmers
and the entrepreneurs (Agapitos and Mavraganis 1995; Eble and Petrova 2013, 18).
Moreover, the principles of horizontal and vertical equity have been continually
undermined, through the increased number of tax exemptions and the frequent tax
amnesties (Bronchi 2002).
1.2. Volume and structure of public revenues from 1995 to 2008
Regarding public revenues, the period between 1995 and 2008 can be subdivided
into two major periods. In the ﬁrst period (1995–2000) the main objective of eco-
nomic policy was to meet the Maastricht convergence criteria in order for the coun-
try to enter the Eurozone. There was a signiﬁcant rise in public revenues (total
receipts from taxes and social contributions) which in 1999 reached 39.6% of the
GDP as compared with 34.7% in 1995 (Table A1 – Appendix 1). About 70% of
the increase came from tax receipts and the remaining 30% from the increased
social contributions revenues produced by the increased volume of employment.
In the case of tax receipts (i.e. taxes on production and imports, taxes on
income and wealth, and capital taxes), the increase was achieved mainly as a result
of corporate and household income tax (Tables A1 and A2 – Appendix 1). In 2000
the corporate income tax receipts rose to 4.1% of the GDP as compared with 2.3%
of the GDP in 1995. Accordingly, revenues from the household/personal income
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 79
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tax (PIT) increased from 4.1% in 1995 to 5.0% in 2000. This increase is mainly
due to the abolishment of several social tax exemptions such as family allowances
(Manesiotis and Reischauer 2002). On the other side, the revenues from VAT sim-
ply followed the growth of consumption (6.8% in 2000 from 5.6% of the GDP in
1995), something which reﬂected the deeper incapability to sufﬁciently address and
curtail the shadow economy and to improve the collection of VAT at a time when
tax evasion remained at high levels.
The second period spans between 2000 and 2008. Following accession to the
Eurozone there was a sharp decline in tax revenues, in a manner which was inver-
sely proportional to the increase in the previous period. After 2001, the govern-
ments of PASOK (Socialists) and Nea Dimokratia (Conservatives) gradually
reduced corporate income tax rate from 45% in 1995 to 21% in 2004,7 thus limit-
ing the revenues gained from this tax from 4.1% of the GDP in 2000 to 2.5% in
2008 (Tables A1 and A2 – Appendix 1). Therefore, despite the fact that in 2008
the declared proﬁts were increased by 35.2% when compared to 2004, the tax
revenue was by 1.3% lower than in 2004 (Table 2). Thus, the implicit tax rate of
corporate income in Greece (18.6%) remained at levels well below the Eurozone
average (27.8%) (Eurostat 2013, 257, also see Papageorgiou, Efthimiadis, and
Konstantakopoulou (2012)). At the same time, in spite of the growth of private
consumption, the revenues from VAT increased only slightly (6.8% of the GDP in
2000, 7.1% in 2008), while the tax burden of the households remained on the same
level (5% of the GDP in 1995, 4.8% in 2008).
There were three factors that counterbalanced revenue reduction. The ﬁrst con-
cerned the state’s ability to borrow more and on better terms in the money market.
Although the newly-imposed ﬁscal and monetary discipline was treated by many as
an opportunity to abandon many of the previous, ‘unorthodox’ ﬁnancial practices
(see, e.g. Alogoskouﬁs, Giavazzi, and Laroque 1995; Simitis 2005), entry into the
Eurozone enhanced the role of debt management due to the signiﬁcant decline in
interest rates and improved (cheaper) access to money markets. Indeed, the average
long-term nominal interest rate decreased from 20.7% in 1994 to 3.6% in 2005,
while the average debt maturity rose from 1.6 years in 1994 to 10.5 years in 2005.
Through accession to the Eurozone, the Greek government could borrow at a lower
interest rate and also extend the repayment time period (for a detail discussion, see
Agreitis, Dafermos, and Nikolaidi 2011).
Table 2. Total taxable income and total tax (million of Euros).
2002 2004 2006 2008
Total Taxable income and proﬁts 68,369 83,382 95,395 113,091
Total tax 9022 10,389 11,783 13,466
Personal income Total taxable income 56,641 69,034 80,968 93,688
Total tax 4900 5614 7336 8752
Personal income (employees
and pensioners)
Total taxable income 44,484 55,614 65,594 73,920
Total tax 3521 4126 5686 6456
Personal income (other) Total taxable income 12,157 13,42 15,374 19,768
Total tax 1379 1488 1650 2296
Proﬁts Total taxable proﬁts 11,728 14,348 14,427 19,403
Total tax 4122 4775 4447 4714
Source: General Secretariat of Information Systems, Statistical Bulletin of Taxation Data 2002–2008.
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The second factor which counterbalanced the reduction of tax revenue connects
with the robust growth achieved during the period. From 1995 to 2008, the real
GDP annual growth rate was 3.6%, well above the Eurozone average. As expected,
intense growth followed by increased income/proﬁts, and increased income/proﬁts
yielded more tax revenue.
The third factor concerns the signiﬁcant growth in employment opportunities and
more particularly the multiplication of wage earners. According to the Labour Force
Survey, from 1995 to 2008, wage earners increased from 54% of all employed to
65%. Given the well-known adage that ‘employees do not tax evade’, the increase of
wage labour ratio resulted in a kind of broadened tax base. As indicated in Table 3,
between 2002 and 2008, the number of tax statements submitted by employees and
pensioners increased by 16.5% as compared with the average increase of 13.0% of
all tax statements. Moreover, during the same period, the declared income originating
from salaries and pensions increased by a higher rate than the total declared income
(66.8–59.1%). Given the high level of tax evasion such developments further aggra-
vated the unequal distribution of the tax wedge. Because of the rapid increase of
declared income from salaries and pensions, the composition of tax revenues was
modiﬁed. During the period 2002–2008, the income taxes paid by employees and
pensioners increased from 39 to 48% of all income taxes (Table 2).
In conclusion, the increased revenues between 1995 and 2000 did not result
from a successful national strategy to combat tax evasion. For instance, according
to Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro (2010), the size of shadow economy in
Greece did not change signiﬁcantly during the period in question (24.9% of GDP
in 1991, 28.7% in 2000, 26.9% in 2005 and 26.5% in 2007). In reality, the
increased revenues of that period were partly owed to economic growth which gen-
erated increased income and therefore tax receipts; they were also partly a conse-
quence of the broadening of the tax base caused by the increased wage labour
ratio; and ﬁnally, they were also the result of the abolishment of a number of tax
exemptions of social nature. Between 1995 and 2000, more taxes were collected,
but in a peculiar ‘pre-deposit’ manner, in the name of the national goal of entering
the Eurozone. This is why following Greece’s entry into the Eurozone, and as long
Table 3. Number of tax statements by main source of income and volume of declared
income by source.
Number of tax statements
by main source of income
(thousands)
Volume of income declared by
source (millions of €)
2002 2008 2002–2008 (%) 2002 2008 2002–2008 (%)
Total 4953.1 5598.9 13.0 58,656.6 93,323.8 59.1
Other sources of
income (land, abroad)
520.3 582.1 11.9 5527.5 8510.2 54.0
Merchants, employers
and self-employed
984.3 1054.0 7.1 9940.5 13,230.6 33.1
Farmers 386.2 395.4 2.4 1283.3 1695.3 32.1
Employees and
pensioners
3062.3 3567.4 16.5 41,900.9 69,880.2 66.8
Total tax 4899.2 8751.8 78.6
Source: General Secretariat of Information Systems, Statistical Bulletin of Taxation Data 2002, 2008.
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as the public debt manageable, the exact same factors that led to higher revenues
during the ﬁrst period (i.e. intense growth, cheap borrowing and expansion of wage
labour) permitted the reduction of the corporate tax rate, but also the tolerance of
tax evasion. For this reason, despite its sharp rise after 1995, public debt continued
to ﬂuctuate close to 110% of the GDP.
1.3. The nominal progressivity of the taxation system
Extensive tax evasion and avoidance create a false impression as regards the pur-
portedly progressive nature of the taxation system in Greece. As portrayed in
Table 4, in 2008, 31,500 households declared income of more than €100,000. Even
though these statements accounted for 0.6% of all statements and 5.4% of the total
taxable income, they provided 18.1% of the total tax revenue from PIT. In other
words, the richest 4.9% of the population (those exceeding the income threshold of
€50,000) produced 65.1% of all PIT revenues. In this sense, the system seems to
indicate evidence of strong progressivity since the bulk of the tax revenues
originate from the higher income levels.
Nevertheless, this nominally high progressivity is actually a result of the fact
that the bulk of the declared income originates from salaries and pensions (which
in reality is only a part of total personal income). Put otherwise, the high progres-
sivity of the taxation data only mirrors the progressive taxation of employees and
pensioners. According to the tax statements from the same year, 37.1% of the
income declared by entrepreneurs and self-employed and 56.8% of farmers’ income
originates from wages (Table 5). Similarly, wage labour seems to be the chief
source of income for 45.3% of those who declared more than €100,000 and for
41.5% of those who declared more than €500,000. In other words, the income
declared to the tax authorities is simply the income that could not be hidden. It,
therefore, comes as no surprise that throughout the period between 2002 and 2008,
85.9% of the self-employed and the farmers declared an annual income of less than
€10,000 (in 2002 prices – Figure 1).
Table 4. Number of tax statements, volume of taxable income and total tax revenue
(2008).
Income brackets
Number of tax
statements Taxable income Total tax
In
thousands
Regressive
cumulative
frequency
(%)
In
millions
Regressive
cumulative
frequency
(%)
In
millions
Regressive
cumulative
frequency
(%)
€0–10,000 2328.9 100.0 12,021.4 100.0 42.4 100.0
€10,000.01–20,000 1766.0 58.4 24,953.6 87.2 662.6 99.5
€20,000.01–50,000 1261.0 26.9 38,271.5 60.5 4050.7 92.2
€50,000.01–100,000 211.5 4.3 13,615.6 19.7 2709.8 47.1
€100,000.01–500,000 31.1 0.6 4557.7 5.2 1413.7 16.9
€500,000.01+ 0.3 0.01 268.3 0.29 104.7 1.17
Total 5598.9 93,688.0 8983.9
Source: General Secretariat of Information Systems, Statistical Bulletin of Taxation Data 2008.
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Tax avoidance and tax evasion remained a structural feature of the Greek taxa-
tion system, characterizing the higher as well as the lower income groups. Some
population groups, such as high-status professionals (like surgeons, private practi-
tioners, lawyers etc.) and the self-employed, were evading tax thanks to the oppor-
tunities they had to disguise their actual incomes;8 others, such as farmers and
engineers, did so thanks to the institutionalized understatement of their earnings,
while managers and executives thanks to the autonomous taxation of their income;
Table 5. Percentage of income from salaries by occupational group and income brackets
(2008).
%
By main occupation
All professions (total) 74.9
From rental income 18.0
Traders–industrialists–craftsmen–small traders 27.1
Farmers–livestock breeders–ﬁshermen 56.8
Wage earners 96.9
Freelance workers 51.6
Pensioners 92.2
By total declared income
Total 74.9
Less that €10,000 76.2
From €10,000.01 to 30,000 78.8
From €30,000.01 to 50,000.1 77.3
From €50,000.01 to 100,000.01 68.5
From €100,000.01 to 500,000 45.3
More than €500,000.01+ 41.5
Source: General Secretariat of Information Systems, Statistical Bulletin of Taxation Data 2008.
Figure 1. Declared earnings by different occupational groups – average 2002–2008 (at
2002 prices).
Source: General Secretariat of Information Systems, Statistical Bulletin of Taxation Data
2002–2008.
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for their part, large corporations screened their income by employing the 500 tax
exemptions afforded to them (Stathakis 2011),9 while small and medium enterprises
did so through a special scheme which permitted them to calculate their tax
obligations by themselves (Gk. aftopereosi).
In the light of the above, governmental interventions in the tax system between
1995 and 2008 were highly distributive – as opposed to redistributive – since they
resulted in the channelling of the surplus generated from the robust growth towards
business elites and speciﬁc social groups. For this very reason, the elasticity of tax
revenues is low with respect to the economic cycle (Manesiotis and Reischauer
2002), but high with respect to the electoral cycle (Christodoulakis and Skouras
2009).
It is crucial to stress that this policy ensured a broad social consensus, because
the sources of income of a narrow majority of the population were (and still are)
highly fragmented, and self-employment remains at high levels (for the relation
between self-employed and shadow economy see, Tanzi 1999; ILO 2002; Williams
2010). Maintaining in force a taxation system with numerous tax avoidance loop-
holes and weak tax audit ability, favoured – even if unequally– numerous profes-
sional groups. Therefore, while not everybody proﬁted equally, those who did so,
even in a marginal way, were not few.
The big losers from this tax policy were the employees, the pensioners, the
unemployed and in general the poorest sectors of the population. Not only were
they the ones who were ‘picking up the tab’, but also, at the same time, they were
deprived of the much-needed services of a welfare state. Since the entitlement of
social beneﬁts of various sorts is linked to the level of income, a number of real
low-income earners found themselves excluded from access to social beneﬁts since
their declared income was deemed to be higher than that of less ‘well-fortunate’.
Because of protracted tax evasion and shadow economy, an employee with income
equal to the basic salary (i.e. around €9000/year in 2008) appeared to be in the
same ﬁnancial position with the 66% of the entrepreneurs and 96% of the farmers
(Statistical Bulletin of Taxation 2008, Table 8A). According to Förster and Pearson
(2002, 31), before the crisis set in the poorest 30% of the Greek population
received only 20.9% of social transfers, while the richest 40% received 41.5%. This
trend lies behind the fact that social transfers in Greece decrease the poverty rate
only by 6% (EU average is 20%) (Maniatis 2003; Dafermos and Papatheodorou
2010, 11 estimated the redistributive effect of the net social wage in Greece to be
almost zero).
2. The necessary reform that never took place
In the light of the above, there are several reasons which render necessary a reform
of the taxation system. Firstly, there is a widespread demand for a just distribution
of the tax burden across the various groups of the population. The second reason
relates to the recession of the Greek economy itself; tax reform in Greece is thus
necessary not only for social reasons but also for economic ones. Since external
borrowing is limited and ‘printing money’ is not feasible, the only possible domes-
tic policy to fund a public investment programme is to productively reallocate
existing spending as well as to enhance the taxation system. In other words, a tax
reform would not only contribute to a just redistribution of the tax burden but also
to ‘reveal’ additional funds.
84 Y. Ioannidis
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [9
4.6
6.7
3.3
7]
 at
 11
:21
 11
 M
arc
h 2
01
5 
However, the tax agenda of the bipartite government (Nea Dimokratia and
PASOK) has led to movements in the opposite direction than the one needed. The
new system of income taxation (Law 4110/2013) and the controversy over the
taxation of real estate exemplify this.
2.1. The new system of income taxation
It is a common assumption in Greece that the main problem of the previous taxa-
tion systems lies in the numerous special tax regimes. A large proportion of per-
sonal and corporate income either remains untaxed on account of tax exemption
loopholes or is under taxed due to extensive separate taxation schemes. Therefore,
an appropriate solution would be to tax jointly all of the taxable income under pro-
gressive taxation brackets (Economic Chamber of Greece 2010; Rapanos 2012).
The government chose otherwise. Law 4110/2013 introduced a new method of
taxing income which differentiates taxation (as well as tax rates) according to the
source of income. Instead of one single tax scale and numerous loopholes, the new
legislation retains the same number of loopholes whilst introducing ﬁve different
modes of taxation: one for employees and pensioners, another one for farmers,
another for self-employed persons and entrepreneurs, one for those living off rental
income and ﬁnally one for income out of securities.
It is well known that the differentiation in the modes of taxation favours the
wealthier groups since they exhibit a greater variety of income sources (taxing two
‘packages’ of €50,000 yields less revenue than taxing one single ‘package’ of
€100,000). In 2010, for example, approximately 39,000 people declared an income
which exceeded €100,000, with an average personal income amounting to
€149,000. If this income were to be taxed jointly (i.e. the tax brackets of the wage
earners), it would have yielded a sum equal to €54,000. By contrast, if the same
amount of income was to be taxed on the basis of its source, it would have given
€42,000, i.e. 22% less tax. Indeed, under the new mode of taxation, the tax burden
for higher incomes (set at €50,000 and above) has been reduced for everybody
except for the employees (Table 6).
Table 6. Impact of the new system of taxation of personal income by occupational group.
Professional group
In comparison with the previous mode of taxation
Increase in tax Reduction in tax
Wage earners with income… …over €26,000 (20% of the
employees)
…from €5000 to
€26,000
Professionals and self-employed with
income…
…up to €57,000 (97% of the
self-employed)
…over €57,000
Farmers with income… …up to €22,000 (98% of the
farmers)
…over €22,000
Income from rents… …up to €50,000 …over €50,000
Income from multiple sources… …up to €9000. …over €9000.
Income from stocks and bonds All taxpayers with income from loyalties, stocks or
bonds are paying less tax due to the reduced tax rate
(from 25 to 10%)
Source: own estimations.
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However, taxing income according to its source beneﬁts not only the wealthiest
income groups but also a broader group of taxpayers, which comprise nearly 29%
of the taxable population: those with incomes received through rental properties.10
Under the new system of taxing rental income, there is a direct transfer of the tax
burden from the poorest to the middle-income groups (Table A3 in Appendix 1),
aiming at ensuring the political tolerance of the latter towards the new system. For
example, a low-income taxpayer, with an annual income of €9,000, 50% of which
is rental, will be obliged to pay a tax of €450. If the same amount of income is
provided entirely from salaries, they would not have to pay any tax. On the con-
trary, a medium-income taxpayer, i.e. with annual income of €24,000, 50% of
which is rental and 50% from wages, will have to pay a tax of €1570. If the same
amount of income comes entirely from salaries, they will have to pay a tax of
€3390. In other words, a person with a low pension/wage and a complementary
low rental income will pay more tax than before, while a person with a medium
wage and a complementary medium rental income will pay less tax than before.
The same distorted logic is enforced with respect to the taxation of the
self-employed persons. In Greece, as elsewhere, the self-employed tax evades more
frequently than other taxpayers because of their enhanced ability to conceal income
from the tax authorities (Schneider 2011).11 However, in order to collect more taxes
from the self-employed, the government did not adopt a strategy to combat tax eva-
sion through measures aimed at specifying the real income. It chose to tax at a
higher rate the income which had already been declared, thereby creating even
stronger incentive for hiding income.
Secondly, the new system equates the self-employed with companies. This
means that from now on they will be taxed under a single tax rate according to
their proﬁts (income minus expenses); 21% for the ﬁrst €50,000 and 35% for the
excessive sum. Essentially, the novel mode of taxation of the self-employed penal-
izes those who were declaring their true income while rewarding those that were
tax evading, because in fact a tax rate of 21% is high if applied to a low annual
income (i.e. €10,000) and low if applied to higher one (i.e. €45,000). A self-
employed taxpayer who declares their true income will pay more tax, while some-
one concealing their income will also pay more but, ultimately, considerably less to
what they should have.
All in all, this system of taxation raises signiﬁcant moral questions, for it
equates personal income with proﬁts. Nevertheless in actual fact, there is no such
thing as a ‘poor company’, but there are poor self-employed people; a person may
go bankrupt, but cannot ‘shut down’ like a company can; a company does not have
‘household members to care for’ as a person may have; furthermore, personal/
household income deﬁnes who receives social beneﬁts while proﬁts don’t.
Finally, an additional noteworthy feature of the new system is the taxation of
agricultural income with a ﬂat rate of 13% regardless of the size of the income,
with poorer and richer citizens being taxed at the same rate.
In conclusion, the new taxation system favours the higher income groups
while also affording signiﬁcant concessions to the middle-income groups (Table 6).
Those favoured include the wealthiest groups, the medium-upper self-employed
and shop owners, as well as richer farmers and major landholders. Those who
were taxevading ‘a bit’ will end up paying more tax, but not as much as they
should, and those who were declaring their actual income will pay considerably
higher taxes.
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2.2. The taxation of real estate
Tax revenues from real estate were extremely low until 2009, accounting from
somewhere between 350 and 400 million Euros per year. Given the inaccurate
widespread belief that land ownership is highly fragmented, it was widely argued
that by not taxing real estate property, the state is implementing a kind of social
policy which is in favour of the majority of the small owners.
While it is an established fact that, for historical reasons, real estate ownership in
Greece is not as concentrated as in Western Europe (Sampaniotis and Chardouvelis
2012), the dispersion of real estate ownership is not nearly as high as it is believed
to be. Data from the Ministry of Finance indicate that when it comes to privately
owned urban land 34% of the owners own 74% of the total land value, while the
richest 2% of the owners (property over €500.000) hold 20% of the total urban land
value (Table 7). The available data reveal that the under taxation of real estate, in
general, was not functioning as a social policy but was a reality mainly favouring
the wealthiest population groups. While a policy aimed at protecting small owners
would had excluded from taxation land value up to a certain amount and would
have taxed the rest, all land value was under taxed instead.
Moreover, several factors indicate that the taxation of real estate could end up
having signiﬁcant political cost. Firstly, the owners of high-value urban estate were
represented by a powerful and active organization (POMIDA) which maintained
close political connections with a number of parliamentarians of the ruling parties
(Nea Dimocratia and PASOK). Secondly, as demonstrated by the European elec-
tions of May 2014, the rural population – also owners of non-urban parcels – con-
stituted the most signiﬁcant electoral base of the two out of three co-governing
parties (ND and PASOK). Finally, there were a number of important technical prob-
lems which could not be resolved in time. For instance, the value assessments used
by the tax authorities were out-of-date (Kathimerini, October 13, 2014c) since they
were referring to a totally different economic context, (dating to 2009); the National
Registry of Land Ownership (Ktimatologio) was (and still is) under development
(since 1995); the relevant databases of the Ministries of Agriculture and Economics
were (and still are) not compatible with each other. In that sense, there was the dan-
ger (ultimately realized, see Kathimerini, Wednesday August 13, 2014a) of making
planning mistakes in the tax estimation mechanics. These factors, combined with
the extremely ambitious budgetary goal, rendered it virtually impossible to arrive at
a solution at minimum political cost.
Table 7. Distribution according to the value of urban real estate held by individuals.
% of people % of urban real estate value
From €0.01 to 300,000 94.8 67.4
Of which…
From €0.01 to 50,000€ 49.8 12.3
From €50,000.01 to 100,000 24.4 18.8
From €100,000.01 to 200,000 15.8 23.7
From €200,000.01 to 300,000 4.8 12.6
Over €300,000 5.2 32.6
Of which: over €1000,000 0.5 8.5
Source: Ministry of Finance, Capital Taxes Directorate, Department of FMAP-ETAK.
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Pressured to boost state revenues, the Papademos administration (PASOK with
the support of Nea Dimokratia and the nationalistic LAOS – Popular Orthodox
Party) set as their goal to increase property taxation revenues from €0.4 billion
Euros to €3.0 billion annually. It should be noted that given the radical decrease in
household income, this target was extremely difﬁcult to achieve at that time.
Initially, the government chose to tax only buildings connected to the electricity
network (Law 4021/2011). In this way, the rural population was somehow protected
(since the parcels were excluded from taxation), as well as the high urban (??)
value owners (since they could disconnect empty non-rented buildings from the
electricity network). As a consequence, the tax-weight shifted overwhelmingly to
the household residence. Considering that the network buildings connected to
electricity constitute only a portion of total property, the amount charged was quite
signiﬁcant (over €600 for houses of 100 m2). Moreover, the absence of special
provisions for the unemployed and the penalty of power cuts in the event of non-
payment, added a particularly onerous feature to this measure.
Under social pressure, the coalition government that emerged from June’s 2012
elections (Nea Dimokratia with the support of PASOK and the Democratic Left
party) pledged to introduce another mode of taxation that would replace the previ-
ous one. For this purpose, a committee was established (in which the author was a
member) under the presidency of the Deputy Minister of Finance and with the par-
ticipation of representatives from the three governing political parties, scientiﬁc
advisors and high ranking-civil servants. The mandate of the committee was to sub-
mit a proposal which would yield the same amount of revenue (€3000 millions) by
widening the tax base – thus making it possible to lighten the tax burden of each
individual taxpayer. The only way for this to be achieved was by including into the
taxable property the rural plots and all of the buildings.
Four months later, the committee suggested the inclusion of ecclesiastical and
monastic property, argued for the need to introduce a non-taxable value to protect
low-value properties and also proposed the tax exception of the unemployed and
all at-risk-of-poverty households. To ﬁnance this, the committee recommended the
inclusion to the taxable property of all private-owned land property and its taxation
under a progressive taxation scale. Moreover, it produced more than 10 scenarios
on the basis of various possible revenue targets. According to these scenarios, the
small residential property owners would enjoy signiﬁcant tax reductions (55% per
average) and farmers and small parcel owners would have to pay a small amount
of tax (around 1–6€/hectare for the agricultural land), while the major landowners
and the holders of high-value urban real estate would stand to lose from this
arrangement.
However, the most difﬁcult task was to reach a political agreement on the level
of taxation of the rural plots. The governing parties resisted the idea of taxing rural
land ownership in view of the electoral cost this would entail. By June 2013, the
government rejected the proposals of the committee, cancelled its mandate and
entrusted the design of the new taxation system to ministerial advisors.
Following numerous delays, the government ﬁnally introduced Law 4223/2013
(ENFIA). Under the new law, the object of taxation was not the total personal
property value but the individual building/plot. In this way, the large real estate
owners have been considerably favoured (as it is rare to own land valued at i.e.
€1000,000 which is also concentrated in one building/plot). At the same time, the
tax burden of the rural plots has been minimized by reducing the budgetary goals.
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In total, a fund reallocation of nearly €650 million12 has been used to lighten the
tax burden on the non-urban plots instead of, say, introducing tax exemptions for
small property owners or the unemployed.
All in all, the tax wedge on urban property has been eased but the reduction
has been rather modest (Table 8). Moreover, the government partially responded to
POMIDA’s ‘request and warning’ (Kathimerini, August 26, 2014d) by reducing the
tax burden of the non-rented empty buildings by 20%. In this way, taxpayers pay
tax for their residence but not for the non-rented apartment (or building) they might
own. As Table 8 demonstrates, the government has chosen to enforce higher tax
rates for lowest property values in order to ease the burden of the higher value
property. What is striking is that an owner of a building of 1,000,000€ value will
pay less tax under previous laws despite the fact that the total amount of tax
collected has been raised from 400 million to 3000.
3. The political economy of the Greek taxation system: ﬁnal remarks
It is indisputable that the Greek tax system is unjust as well as inefﬁcient. What
usually escapes our attention, however, is that its stability was grounded in a broad
social alliance which includes not only powerful business elites but also various
large social groups, especially those comprising the self-employed, highly skilled
professionals (such as lawyers, doctors and engineers) and farmers. The common
feature that these diverse social groups enjoy is the persistent under taxation of
their wealth, a situation which is mirrored negatively (in the form of over taxation)
in the case of employees and pensioners.
Nevertheless, it must be underlined that those who beneﬁt from this system are
not necessarily wealthy. A coffee shop owner in the small island of Ikaria may earn
exactly the same amount of money as a bank clerk; but it is most probable –
almost certain, in fact – that the former has paid less tax than the latter. Conse-
quently, the clear class structure of the taxation system cannot be described accord-
ing to an outdated dichotomy between the ‘few rich’ and the ‘masses’. This class
structure crosscuts ‘the people’ placing each one according the level and source of
their income. Therefore, we end up with as much taxation consciousness as sources
of income. Needless to say that the fragmentation of taxation modes does not
encourage the development of a common tax consciousness.
Ironically, the structural transformation which the Greek economy has under-
gone over the past 20 years, the growth of the wage earners ratio, Eurozone mem-
bership and the concomitant minimization of the borrowing costs are all elements
Table 8. Tax wedge (in €) according to the different tax regimes on real estate taxation,
rough estimations.
Property
value
FAP 2010
(law 3842/2010)
EETIDE
(law 4021/2011)
ΕΕΤΑ
(law 4152/2012)
Committee
proposal*
ENFIA
(law4223/
2013)
1000,000 4400 3000 2600 7900 2500
530,000 600 1600 1400 3200 1300
95,000 0 500 425 111 370
60,000 0 400 340 39 300
*Under the scenario of total revenues 1700 million Euros and non-taxable of €30,000.
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which gave an impetus to tax exemption, tax avoidance or simply tax evasion by
speciﬁc population groups. This policy resulted in a greater tax inequality at the
expense of wage earners and pensioners. Unfortunately, the governmental interven-
tions of the last three years have not improved this and today the Greek taxation
system remains as unfair as ever; the only difference, though essential, is that the
overall taxation burden has nearly doubled.
Addressing these problems appears today to be an even more difﬁcult task. To
begin with, the tax reform was delayed for far too long: after six years of deep
recession, a signiﬁcant part of the accumulated wealth has been consumed.
Secondly, under the pressures applied to the household income, tax evasion is grad-
ually being transformed to a survival mechanism instead of a means of wealth
accumulation. Finally, the conservative party (Nea Dimocratia) is unwilling to run
counter to the few social groups which continue to support the government. On top
of all these reasons, the ever-present climate of political polarization is not condu-
cive to the development of a dispassionate and constructive dialogue.
The study of modern Greek history reveals that domestic political life is charac-
terized by an intense discursive polarization which gives rise to an ‘identity-based
politics’ as opposed to the more traditional ‘issue-based politics’ (Voulgaris 2005).
In this context, the major political parties, regardless of their ideology, do not nec-
essarily forge social alliances according to a programmatic agenda in a number of
issues. Instead, they tend to formulate cleavages based on a collective political
identity (i.e. the Left vs. the Right, the Good vs. the Corrupt, the patriots vs. the
traitors, etc.) which crosscut social classes. In this setting, a highly polarized politi-
cal discourse plays a critical role. Conﬂicts on issues relating to the production
sphere, to the distribution of wealth or to the distribution of power among different
social groups or classes tend to be resolved within the major parties. In other
words, the political ability of the major parties to govern depends primarily on their
ability to produce, through internal procedures, a synthesis of the different eco-
nomic and social demands and then to ‘export’ this synthesis in the form of gov-
ernment policy (Ioannidis 2012). In this sense, political parties function in a way
similar to the one Poulantzas attributed to the state: they hierarchically integrate
conﬂicting interests (Jessop 1985; Poulantzas 2001). Indeed, the clientelistic charac-
ter of the political system remains strong by virtue of its ability to continually
regenerate its capacity to consolidate conﬂicting interests, to promote consensus
based on multi-lateral, but rarely common (in the sense of a ‘social contract’)
agreements. The peculiar distributional nature of the Greek taxation system can be
viewed as the fruit of a policy which promotes a kind of economic liberalization
accompanied by strong clientelistic relations.
Notes
1. Real GDP grew from 1980 to 2008 by 79.3%; a growth that took place almost entirely
after 1995. Real GDP growth was 13.9% from 1980 to 1995 and 57.4% from 1995 to
2008 (AMECO database GRC.1.1.0.0.OVGD).
2. From 1980 to 2008 the agriculture gross value added (GVA) decreased from 14.9 to
3.6%, the GVA of the secondary sector decreased from 29.6 to 18.1%, while the GVA
of the services rose from 55.5 to 78.3% (AMECO database GRC.1.1.0.0.OVG0;
GRC.1.1.0.0.OVG1; GRC.1.1.0.0.OVG5).
3. The major change in the structure of the labour market had to do with the ‘boom’ of
the wage earners (50.5% of the total employment in 1983, 65.0% in 2008). For
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instance, according to the Labour Force Survey, in 1988 wage earners were the major-
ity of the employed in only two (2) out of the thirteen (13) regions of the country. In
2009 the region of Peloponnese was the only one in which the wage earners accounted
for less than 50% of the total employment.
4. A process of business polarization was initiated: the average size of the average com-
pany decreased while the average size of the big company increased. In 2004 all the
sectors of manufacture numbered fewer companies with more than 10 employees com-
pared to 1994 while the proportion of employees per employer in the manufacturing
companies with more than 50 employees increased from 46.1 in 1993 to 121.5 in
2005.
5. For a detailed discussion see Liberaki and Tinios (2010), Lianos (2003).
6. For a detailed discussion see Ioannidis (2012).
7. Laws 2238/94, 2992/02, 3091/02, 3296/04, 3220/04, 3427/05, 3453/06, 3483/06, 3517/
06, 3522/06, 3634/08, 3697/08.
8. For estimations regarding the tax evasion by occupational group see Artavanis, Morse,
and Tsoutsoura (2012), Matsaganis and Flevotomou (2010).
9. For a detail discussion on tax evasion in big corporations see Kannelopoulos (2002).
10. 10% for income up to €12,000 euro and 33% for income exceeding €12,000.
11. Moreover, Schneider and Buehn (2012) argue that in the case of Greece self-
employment appears to be the most signiﬁcantly correlated variable with the size of
the shadow economy.
12. The ﬁnal budgetary goal was set at €2650 million (Greek Ministry of Finance, State
Budget of 2014), that is €250 million less than the amount originally agreed with the
Troika (Kathimerini, August 26, 2014b). Moreover, €400 million was to come from a
special tax on urban land owners with properties valued at a sum exceeded €300,000.
In other words, there was a reallocation of nearly €650 million.
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Table A2. Tax receipts of the General Government, Greece, 1995–2008 (percentage of
GDP).
INDIC_NA/TIME 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
D2_D5_D91_D611_D612_M_D995 – Total
receipts from taxes and social contributions
(including imputed social contributions) after
deduction of amounts assessed but unlikely
to be collected
35.1 38.4 36.5 35.7 33.4 33.4 34.2
D2_D5_D91 – Total tax receipts 22.2 24.9 24.1 22.1 20.1 21.0 21.0
D2 – Taxes on production and imports 14.8 15.1 14.2 13.3 12.0 12.7 12.7
D21 – Taxes on products 14.0 14.5 13.6 12.9 11.7 12.3 12.3
D211 – Value added type taxes (VAT) 7.0 7.5 7.2 7.6 6.8 7.1 7.3
D212 – Taxes and duties on imports
excluding VAT
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3
D214 – Taxes on products, except VAT
and import taxes
6.9 6.8 6.2 5.1 4.7 5.0 4.7
D29 – Other taxes on production 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4
D5 – Current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 7.1 9.5 9.7 8.6 8.0 8.1 8.0
D51 – Taxes on income 6.7 9.1 9.3 8.1 7.5 7.5 7.5
D51A – Taxes on individual or household
income
4.1 5.5 5.0 4.5 4.4 4.6 4.8
D51B – Taxes on corporate proﬁt incomes 2.3 3.1 4.1 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.5
D51E – Other taxes on income n.e.c. 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
D59 – Other current taxes 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5
D91 – Capital taxes 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3
D611 – Actual social contributions 10.8 11.5 10.5 11.6 11.2 10.7 11.1
Source: Eurostat
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Table A3. Tax wedge (in Euros) under the previous and the new regime of PIT.
Income (in €) 9,000 12,000 24,000 50,000 100,000 251,000
Tax wedge (in €) under the
previous tax regime
400 700 3,420 12,620 39,590 100,340
Tax wedge
(in €) under
the new
tax regime
if income…
…only from salaries 0 540 3,480 14,300 35,300 98,720
Difference to previous
tax regime
−400 −160 60 1,680 −4,290 −1,620
…only from
entrepreneurship
117 1,820 4,940 11,700 28,200 78,300
Difference to previous
tax regime
−283 1,120 1,520 −920 −11,390 −22,040
…only from farming 1,170 1,560 3,120 6,500 13,000 32,630
Difference to previous
tax regime
770 860 −300 −6,120 −26,590 −67,710
…only from rents 900 1,200 5,160 13,740 30,240 80,070
Difference to previous
tax regime
500 500 1,740 1,120 −9,350 −20,270
…70% from salaries and
30% from rents
270 360 2,316 10,190 29,840 89,183
Difference to previous
tax regime
−130 −340 −1,104 −2,430 −9,750 −11,157
…70% entrepreneurship
and 30% from rents
1,089 1,452 3,788 9,990 25,440 75,270
Difference to previous
tax regime
689 752 368 −2,630 −14,150 −25,070
…70% form farming
and 30% from rents
412 549 1,212 3,489 10,447 31,874
Difference to previous
tax regime
12 −151 −2,208 −9,131 −29,143 −68,466
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